An airdrop would entail a large formation conducting an air refueling at night with minimal lighting and no radio calls, a night drop in around high terrain, and of course, the risk to the soldiers and airmen fully laden with weapons and equipment jumping from a fast-moving C-17 at low altitude. Did the Iraqis have the skill and intent to contest the operation with an integrated air defense system of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery? Aside from these strategic and tactical risks, simply executing the mission would be difficult. There was much uncertainty and risk, including the requirement to fly over a nation that had just denied us the right to enter Iraq from its soil. Naturally, the risk of such a mission was debated with detractors seeking an alternative. The “mass air drop” would occur in the semi-permissive environment of Kurdish-controlled territory north of the “Green Line,” the unofficial territorial border between Kurdish and Iraqi forces. Without a viable overland route into land-locked northern Iraq, the planners considered a vertical insertion of conventional and special operations forces to perform push out Saddam Hussein’s forces and then perform multiple wide-area security missions. The sense of urgency among the planners was palpable. The war was already raging in the south of Iraq and planners knew that at any time conditions in the north could change, further complicating the mission. Though the land route was denied, the requirement to seize and hold parts of northern Iraq to pressure Saddam from north and south remained. Military planners were coordinating for months with Turkish officials when this unwelcome surprise came. The cause of this sudden rush to plan was the last-minute decision by the government of Turkey to deny access necessary for the original concept of coalition mechanized forces flowing south from staging bases in Turkey. As I reflect on those experiences twenty years later, the lessons that stand out as being particularly relevant are decision making under conditions of ambiguity, setting the conditions for successful rapid joint planning, and the requirements for successful power projection.ĭecision Making Under Conditions of Ambiguity Today, as the course director for the Military Strategy and Campaigning course at the Army War College, it is clear to me that Operation NORTHERN DELAY and other recent experiences still have great relevance to our mission of honing students’ military judgment. Twenty years ago, I helped plan and execute that operation as an Air Force airman. Some might claim that experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have little relevance for our current challenges. It was 12 March 2003 and a group of planners in Qatar had just two weeks to plan the largest mass airborne drop in contemporary history -15 USAF C-17As dropping approximately 1,000 Army and Air Force personnel with all of their equipment into northern Iraq. MG Harrell’s characterization of what came to be known as Operation NORTHERN DELAY was not an overstatement. “Ladies and gentlemen, this is high stakes poker, and all the chips are on the table.” Major General Gary L.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |